O teste anti-satélite e o programa espacial da China

O teste de míssil anti-satélite chinês gerou um coro de protestos face ao perigo de uma nova corrida ao armamento espacial. Na verdade, ao não negar (assumindo por omissão) o ensaio, Pequim deixa uma mensagem ao mundo e em especial aos EUA. É esse o ponto de vista de Joseph Kahn, neste artigo publicado pelo New York Times e International Herald Tribune:

"Some analysts suggested that one possible motivation was to prod the Bush administration to negotiate a treaty to ban space weapons. Russia and China have advocated such a treaty, but President Bush rejected those calls when he authorized a policy that seeks to preserve "freedom of action" in space”.

Já em 2002, A.V. Lele (1), analista do Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (Índia) argumentava que,

"China’s space-based surveillance and remote sensing will increase PLA’s situational awareness. It will help the PLA to understand and analyse USAF assets in more detail. China’s interest in a variety of anti-satellite capabilities, ranging from jammers and blinders to direct energy weapons, poses a threat to US".

É importante entender este ensaio num plano mais amplo que contemple a estratégia da República Popular da China para o espaço. No papel, a política espacial chinesa deve seguir os princípios delineados por Deng Xiaoping: uma política externa independente baseada nos princípios da “Paz e Desenvolvimento”. O “Livro Branco das Actividades Espaciais da China", publicado em 2000 assinala que a política espacial deve servir uma estratégia compreensiva de desenvolvimento,

“in implementing the strategy of revitalizing the country with science and education and that of sustainable development, as well as in economic construction, national security, science and technology development and social progress”.

O programa especial chinês chamou a atenção dos mais distraídos quando em 2003, Yang Liwei se tornou no primeiro taikonauta, ou seja, no primeiro astronauta chinês, a bordo da Shenzhou V (Nave Divina V) Dois anos depois Fei Junlong e Nie Haisheng na missão Shenzhou VI regressaram ao espaço. A China ingressara no clube restrito onde estão EUA e Rússia que enviaram missões tripuladas ao espaço. Mas naturalmente, a estratégia da China vai para além de enviar mais taikonautas para o espaço. O referido Livro Branco estabelece que, no médio-prazo, sejam criados e desenvolvidos projectos, entre outros, como

1- Um sistema de observação da Terra que permita operações de longo-prazo capazes de monitorizar a atmosfera e os oceanos.

2- Melhorar a acapacidade de lançamento de veículos e criar um sistema independente de satélites de telecomunicações

3- Criar um sistema de navegação eposicionamento por satélite independente

4- Estabelecer um sistema nacional de satélites com aplicações de controlo-remoto

5- Desenvolver pesquisa espacial através do desenvolvimento de um grupo de satélites exploratórios de nova geração

Parte destes objectivos já começaram a ser cumpridos. Ao nível dos satélites de navegação existe um sistema de três satélites geoestacionários denominado Beidou (Ursa Maior). Trata-se de um sistema de satélites que não poderá ser comparado ao norte-americano Global Positioning System (GPS), ao russo GLONASS ou ao futuro Galileo (projecto da União Europeia e da ESA do qual a China faz parte como principal parceiro externo), uma vez que a cobertura é limitada apenas com três satélites – um sistema de GPS normalmente requer entre 25 a 30 satélites em órbita. Todavia, é interessante notar que, seguindo a investigação desenvolvida por George Forden (2), ao passo que o Beidou demostra evidentes fragilidades na condução de armas convencionais em terra - como por exemplo as chamadas bombas inteligentes – preenche os requisitos para melhorar a precisão de mísseis balísticos intercontinentais (ICBM). Por outro lado, a cooperaçãop da China no Galileo permitirá a transferência de tecnologia necessária a no futuro criar um GPS próprio, tal como é enunciado no terceiro ponto referido acima acerca dos objectivos no médio-prazo da política espacial da China. Neste artigo publicado pela Xinhua News Agency (agência noticiosa oficial da República Popular da China), este argumento ganha força:

"China's "Beidou" navigation system is a regional positioning system mainly covering the country and its neighboring areas, thus making vertical positioning impossible and limiting the number of users. Academician Liang Sili, who once served as the general engineer of the nation's Aerospace Ministry, said that the global positioning system is a apace infrastructure facility. China is bound to be a space power in the 21st century, able and necessary to possess its own navigation system. The Sino-EU cooperation will significantly help China to attain its goal".

No mesmo artigo,

“(…) for a long time, what the United States has provided to its military units are precise positioning signals, whereas the ones it provided to other users are low-precision signals (with deliberately added interference). That is to say, only Americans know the exact position of any object on the earth, other countries only have a "general idea" concerning the position"

O fim do unipolarismo norte-americano também no espaço parece ser também uma inevitabilidade. Falta agora saber se o desenho de um mundo bipolar (tripolar ou mesmo multipolar se incluirmos a Rússia e a UE com o Galileo), poderá transformar-se num espaço multilateral. Para isso terão que ser constituídos regimes (no sentido do liberal-institucionalismo). Com os recentes desenvolvimentos a China procura também colcar-se numa posição em que a recusa dos EUA em incluir Pequim no Projecto da Estação Espacial Internacional, um projecto que engloba a ESA, EUA, Rússia, Japão e Canadá, seja insustentável. A ascençãod a China enquanto um Space Player, quer metermos de aplicações civis como militares – e sabemos que ambas as dimensões estão intimamente ligadas –deve ser absorvida. A China deve ser engaged não apenas na ONU ou OMC mas também como um poder espacial. Numa perspectiva realista (no sentido das teorias das Relações Internacionais) o dilema de segurança e as pulsões sinófobas poderão fazer com que a resposta dos EUA a esta ascensão seja de escalada. O terreno (o espaço) é escorregadio.

(1) Lele, A. V. (2002, April). "China as a Space Power". Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA Apr-Jun 2002 (Vol. XXVI).

(2) Forden, Geoffrey (2004). "China’s Satellite-Based Navigation System: Implications for Conventional and Strategic Forces". Breakthroughs, Vol. XIII, no. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 8-13.

P.S. Ler também:

Matias, José Carlos (2006). O Grande Salto. Revista Macau IV Série N°2 Março, 2006.

Flexing muscle, China destroys satellite in test

International Herald Tribune.

By William J. Broad and David E. Sanger
Thursday, January 18, 2007


"China successfully carried out its first test of an antisatellite weapon last week, signaling its resolve to play a major role in military space activities and bringing expressions of concern from Washington and other capitals, the Bush administration said yesterday.
Only two nations — the Soviet Union and the United States — have previously destroyed spacecraft in antisatellite tests, most recently the United States in the mid-1980s.
Arms control experts called the test, in which the weapon destroyed an aging Chinese weather satellite, a troubling development that could foreshadow an antisatellite arms race. Alternatively, however, some experts speculated that it could precede a diplomatic effort by China to prod the Bush administration into negotiations on a weapons ban.
"This is the first real escalation in the weaponization of space that we've seen in 20 years," said Jonathan McDowell, a Harvard astronomer who tracks rocket launchings and space activity. "It ends a long period of restraint."
White House officials said the United States and other nations, which they did not identify, had "expressed our concern regarding this action to the Chinese." Despite its protest, the Bush administration has long resisted a global treaty banning such tests because it says it needs freedom of action in space.
Jianhua Li, a spokesman at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, said that he had heard about the antisatellite story but that he had no statement or information.
At a time when China is modernizing its nuclear weapons, expanding the reach of its navy and sending astronauts into orbit for the first time, the test appears to mark a new sphere of technical and military competition. American officials complained yesterday that China had made no public or private announcements about its test, despite repeated requests by American officials for more openness about its actions.
The weather satellite hit by the weapon had circled the globe at an altitude of roughly 500 miles. In theory, the test means that China can now hit American spy satellites, which orbit closer to Earth. The satellites presumably in range of the Chinese missile include most of the imagery satellites used for basic military reconnaissance, which are essentially the eyes of the American intelligence community for military movements, potential nuclear tests and even some counterterrorism, and commercial satellites.
Experts said the weather satellite's speeding remnants could pose a threat to other satellites for years or even decades.
In late August, President George W. Bush authorized a new national space policy that ignored calls for a global prohibition on such tests. The policy said the United States would "preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space" and "dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so." It declared the United States would "deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests."
The Chinese test "could be a shot across the bow," said Theresa Hitchens, director of the Center for Defense Information, a private group in Washington that tracks military programs. "For several years, the Russians and Chinese have been trying to push a treaty to ban space weapons. The concept of exhibiting a hard-power capability to bring somebody to the negotiating table is a classic cold war technique."
Gary Samore, the director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, said in an interview: "I think it makes perfect sense for the Chinese to do this both for deterrence and to hedge their bets. It puts pressure on the U.S. to negotiate agreements not to weaponize space."
Hitchens and other critics have accused the administration of conducting secret research on advanced antisatellite weapons using lasers, which are considered a far speedier and more powerful way of destroying satellites than the weapons of two decades ago.
The White House statement, issued by the National Security Council, said China's "development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space area."
An administration official who had reviewed the intelligence about China's test said the launching was detected by the United States in the early evening of Jan. 11, which would have been early morning on Jan. 12 in China. American satellites tracked the launching of the medium-range ballistic missile, and later space radars saw the debris.
The antisatellite test was first reported late Wednesday on the Web site of Aviation Week and Space Technology, an industry magazine. It said intelligence agencies had yet to "complete confirmation of the test."
The test, the magazine said, appeared to employ a ground-based interceptor that used the sheer force of impact rather than an exploding warhead to shatter the satellite.
Dr. McDowell of Harvard said the satellite was known as Feng Yun, or "wind and cloud." Launched in 1999, it was the third in a series. He said that it was a cube measuring 4.6 feet on each side, and that its solar panels extended about 28 feet. He added that it was due for retirement but that it still appeared to be electronically alive, making it an ideal target.
"If it stops working," he said, "you know you have a successful hit."
David C. Wright, a senior scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, a private group in Cambridge, Mass., said he calculated that the Chinese satellite had shattered into 800 fragments four inches wide or larger, and millions of smaller pieces.
The Soviet Union conducted roughly a dozen antisatellite tests from 1968 to 1982, Dr. McDowell said, adding that the Reagan administration carried out its experiments in 1985 and 1986.
The Bush administration has conducted research that critics say could produce a powerful ground-based laser weapon that would be used against enemy satellites.
The largely secret project, parts of which were made public through Air Force budget documents submitted to Congress last year, appears to be part of a wide-ranging administration effort to develop space weapons, both defensive and offensive.
The administration's laser research is far more ambitious than a previous effort by the Clinton administration to develop an antisatellite laser, though the administration denies that it is an attempt to build a laser weapon.
The current research takes advantage of an optical technique that uses sensors, computers and flexible mirrors to counteract the atmospheric turbulence that seems to make stars twinkle. The weapon would essentially reverse that process, shooting focused beams of light upward with great clarity and force.
Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a group that studies national security, called the Chinese test very un-Chinese.
"There's nothing subtle about this," he said. "They've created a huge debris cloud that will last a quarter century or more. It's at a higher elevation than the test we did in 1985, and for that one the last trackable debris took 17 years to clear out."
Krepon added that the administration had long argued that the world needed no space-weapons treaty because no such arms existed and because the last tests were two decades ago. "It seems," he said, "that argument is no longer operative."