Projecto Galileo

'E.U.China Partnership on the Galileo Satellite System''

2008-05-24T01:20:00.000-07:00

José Carlos Matias

Published by PINR -Power and Interest News Report, on July 17, 2007

hen the European Union and China agreed to cooperate to develop the E.U. Galileo Satellite System in 2003, the United States reacted with strong skepticism since Washington was against the sharing of sensitive dual-use technology (with civilian and military applications) with China. In the past, the United States had tried unsuccessfully to impede the European Union's ability to set up Galileo, which is an alternative to the U.S.-established Global Positioning System (G.P.S.). At the time, U.S. analysts questioned why Brussels was spending money (3.6 billion euros) to duplicate an existing system that was available "for free," and why it was eager to accept Chinese participation in the program.

Four years later, the E.U.-China "maturing partnership" has evolved toward a more complex network of common and contradictory interests, as the transatlantic links have slowly recovered since the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq. Moreover, China has begun to develop its own Global Navigation Satellite System (G.N.S.S.) -- the Beidou-2. At the same time, the Galileo deployment has suffered a crisis due to disagreements among the industries that were awarded the concession to build and deploy the first four satellites of the Galileo system. Public funding may save Galileo, but the best case scenario for a successful program is for the actors involved to pursue a more realistic approach. In addition to China's announcement of upgrading Beidou to mass market applications, Russia has also decided to complete its own G.N.S.S., called Glonass.

In the face of these developments, what will be the impact of developing the Chinese G.N.S.S. for E.U.-China cooperation and to the commercial feasibility of Galileo?

Galileo: Europe's Great Leap Outward

The European Union and the European Space Agency (E.S.A.) made the decision to create its own G.N.S.S. due to a combination of factors that imply political, economic, technological, social and military gains. Politically, Galileo has been portrayed as a guarantee of independence and autonomy from the U.S.-established G.P.S. This perspective became more evident in the aftermath of the Kosovo War when European forces were fully dependent on the U.S. system, a limitation that has worried the actors involved in the development of a European Security and Defense Policy (E.S.D.P.), especially the member states that stand for the modernization of autonomous E.U. military capabilities.

Since the beginning of the definition phase of Galileo, the European Community (E.C.) papers have noted the importance of Galileo for its Rapid Reaction Force, the E.U. peacekeeping missions and, separately, the realm of activities related to the "Petersburg Tasks," the latter of which are a set of security and military tasks in the field of peacekeeping and stability operations, agreed upon in 1992 among the E.U. members.

It is noteworthy to underscore that the defense-related justifications for Galileo have been downplayed by the E.U. institutions. The E.U. institutions have highlighted the economic benefits of a G.N.S.S. Requested by the E.C., the consultancy company Price Waterhouse Coopers drew a business plan for the Galileo project, which was submitted to the European Council of Ministers. According to this study, by involving private sector actors, Galileo "should generate revenues for the operator rising from some 66 [million euros] in 2010 to over 500 [million euros] in 2020." Definitively, Galileo would create a "virtuous cycle" through a spin-off effect in several sectors of the European economy. Moreover, Galileo has been portrayed as an instrument to create thousands of jobs and as a way to avoid the brain drain in the realm of aerospace, aeronautics and satellite industries.

Undoubtedly, Galileo signifies independence and autonomy from the United States and the ownership of cutting-edge technology. Galileo has been regarded as a key instrument not only in the process of modernization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and E.S.D.P., but also part of the ongoing integration of the European Union's defense industry.

The U.S. Response

U.S. opposition to the European G.N.S.S. can be understood in two different, but complementary, perspectives: economic reasons (in terms of market share of G.N.S.S. services) and security and military concerns. In 2001, the former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz addressed the central problem in Washington's perspective by expressing, in a letter to the N.A.T.O. member states, the concern that Galileo could interfere with U.S. military operations guided by G.P.S. Wolfowitz also expressed the willingness of the Pentagon to take part in the development of Galileo, justifying this position with the fact that N.A.T.O. enjoyed the benefits of G.P.S.

After Washington's "diplomatic offensive," analysts thought that the birth of Galileo was in danger. Yet in March 2002, there was a breakthrough and Galileo saw the green light during the Barcelona Summit of Heads of State and Government. After failing to put Galileo on the backburner, Washington started to emphasize concern over the interference of signals between the two G.N.S.S.s. This problem was solved in June 2004 with the interoperability agreement between the United States and the European Union. Yet even before, in October 2003, another problem came into sight when Brussels and Beijing signed the cooperation agreement on the development of Galileo.

The China Dimension

On September 18, 2003, the E.C. announced that China was to join the Galileo undertaking and finance it as a preferential external partner. According to the agreement, China would contribute at least 230 million euros. From Washington's point of view, this partnership posed several dangers to the transatlantic relationship and especially to the security and economic interests of the United States. Basically, by involving China in the development of Galileo, the European Union was indirectly helping the modernization of the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.), an act that is regarded as unacceptable by many analysts and politicians in Washington.

Indeed, it would be almost impossible to prevent the transfer of technology to the Chinese. This has been a very sensitive issue at a time when the United States is increasingly preoccupied with the military capabilities of China. In addition, the Europeans could be, in practice, contradicting the arms embargo imposed on Beijing in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Massacre.

In the worst case scenario -- a war between China and Taiwan -- the P.L.A. would be using the European G.N.S.S. in a war against Taiwanese military forces. The possibility of the P.L.A. using the Galileo system was ruled out by E.U. authorities since the most accurate signal, the Public Regulated Service (P.R.S.), is encrypted and can only be used by specific entities: the European Police Office (Europol), the European Anti-Fraud Office (O.L.A.F.), civil protection services, safety services (Maritime Safety Agency), emergency response services, humanitarian response teams and the E.U. peacekeeping forces involved in the "Petersburg Tasks" missions.

In any case, the United States was not convinced with this guarantee and spurred the development of a new generation of G.P.S. satellites. In 2004, a British media report unveiled that the United States was developing anti-satellite systems capable of wiping out E.U. Galileo satellites if they were being used against U.S. troops.

For the European Union, the partnership with China represents an attractive opportunity to have access to a promising transport and telecommunication market. Right after the signing of the E.U.-China agreement, Loyola de Palacio, the former E.C. commissioner for transport and energy, made Europe's stand very clear, stating that "China will help Galileo become the major world infrastructure for the growing market for location services."

This level of cooperation can only be understood in light of a Sino-European "maturing and comprehensive partnership" based on intense economic and political linkages. Simultaneously, the European Union has been projecting itself as a global player -- for some analysts, a rather civilian power -- with ambition to develop its autonomy and independence from the United States in terms of military capabilities.

Growing Competition from China and Russia

In China's eyes, cooperation in the Galileo project is seen as part of a strategy of strengthening China's position in the international arena, by cooperating in a sensitive technology that disrupts U.S. hegemony in G.N.S.S. In addition, this cooperation appears to be a golden opportunity to benefit from the transfer of expertise and technology in such a sensitive asset. This would be extremely useful in tandem with the Chinese Space Strategy.

In 2000, China published the White Paper on Space Activities, declaring that the creation of an independent satellite navigation and positioning system was a priority. The embryo of this system was already in orbit when China and the European Union agreed on the partnership. The Beidou system consisted, at the time, of three geostationary satellites, whose positioning and navigation coverage and accuracy was far behind what Galileo aimed for.

Analysts believed that the future Beidou-2 (also called Compass System), a 35-satellite constellation, would only be used by the military -- this would justify the decision of investing 230 million euros in the Galileo system. In November 2006, however, China's official news agency, Xinhua, unveiled that the Beidou system would provide, from 2008 onward, commercial open services with a ten-meter accuracy. It was noted that this service could be "free of charge" for the Chinese people and to other countries that would sign agreements with China.

In addition to Chinese pressure, Russia announced in May 2007 that its own G.N.S.S., the Glonass system, which had been only partially operable, would be fully operable and available "for free" to customers in 2009 after the deployment of the remaining satellites of a 24 constellation. Meanwhile, the process of deployment of the first four Galileo satellites went into crisis, due to strong disagreements between the national industries of consortia responsible to build and deploy those satellites. Until July 2007, only one satellite -- Giove A -- was deployed (in December 2005). The whole process is delayed and what was supposed to be in orbit and operable in 2008 was postponed to 2011-2012. In face of these hurdles, the E.U. transport ministers asked the European Commission to draw a plan to "bail out" Galileo through public funding.

Conclusion

Currently, the European Union faces growing pressure from the other major space powers in the realm of satellite positioning and navigation. With the new developments of the Beidou system, the promise of profitable access to the Chinese transport and telecommunication market may be in danger. What was deemed to be strategic cooperation may become strategic competition.

The progress in the Beidou system implies that Chinese authorities were aware of its probable limitations in seizing the military benefits of the transfer of technology. At this moment, it is not clear how the E.U.-China partnership will evolve, given that it faces a complex network of common and contradictory interests. It is plausible that both parties may reach a solution to share the market through consultation. It is important, however, to bear in mind that the E.U.-China relationship is still, to some extent, a consequence of the other parts of the triangular equation: the U.S.-China relationship and the U.S.-E.U. transatlantic alliance.

The rapidly announced development of the Chinese Beidou system and the Russian Glonass has put pressure on E.U. authorities to solve the imbroglio and spur the deployment of the remaining satellites. As a reaction to the foreseeable competition, Brussels has been eager to set up agreements with other countries. In June 2007, the E.S.A. paved the way to satellite cooperation with Africa through a cooperation agreement with the Agency for Security of Air Navigation in Africa and Madagascar. Previously, Israel, Ukraine, India, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and South Korea had signed agreements to become partners and join the Galileo project.

In the meantime, even if there are some doubts on the commercial feasibility, it is becoming clear that the defense and military applications are, per se, a strong reason to use European taxpayer money to save Galileo.

At last!

2007-12-03T19:04:00.000-08:00

"EU agrees Galileo satellite project", EU Observer.
"Galileo satellite finally on track as rival to GPS", Financial Times.
"EU nations 'close' to political agreement on satnav project", AFP

2007-07-17T05:50:00.000-07:00

"E.U.-China Partnership on the Galileo Satellite System" , José Carlos Matias no Power and Interest News Report - PINR, no Asia Times Online e no Japan Focus.

Beidou II in the pipeline

2007-04-16T21:18:00.000-07:00

A China lançou o segundo satélite do sistema de navegação por satélite Beidou, também designado Compass. Pequim está assim a criar um sistema alteranativo ao norte-americano GPS e ao europeu Galileo.
O objectivo da China é em 2008 ter a constelação Beidou em funcionamento… para oferecer vários serviços a cleintes chineses e De vários países da Ásia.
No total vão estar 35 satélites em órbita.
O Beidou vai disponibilizar serviços de posicionamento e navegação a vários sectores, do transporte, à meteorologia, monitorização de áreas florestais, telecomunicações e segurança pública.

"China launches satellite for rival to GPS
Mike Clendenin

04/16/2007 9:40 PM EDT)
--> -->BEIJING — China launched its second navigation satellite over the weekend as part of a plan to build the country's "Compass" navigational system, which will rival America's Global Positioning System and offer services to China and Asia by 2008.
The Beidou-2 satellite lifted off at 4:11 am on Saturday from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in southwest China's Sichuan province, according to the state's Xinhua news agency. It will join a network that will eventually include five geostationary orbit satellites and 30 medium earth orbit satellites.
China said it will use the network to provide positioning services in various sectors, including transportation, meteorology, petroleum prospecting, forest fire monitoring, disaster forecasting, telecommunications and public security. "A satellite navigation and positioning system is of great significance in defending national interests as it touches political, economic and military fields," the newspaper said.
Noting that the US first built its GPS system in the 1970s, the paper said China's vast size warranted a domestic system that would improve on the "rough" details provided by the civilian-side GPS used around the world today. China has also taken part in a European system called Galileo, which will be operational in 2010 or 2011.
Observers believe China will launch another Beidou navigation satellite later this year. In general, China is substantially ramping up its space activity. The launch site used for Beidou is also suspected of being the place where China carried out its first anti-satellite test in January. China is also preparing for a lunar exploratory mission later this year, which will be the precursor to a lunar landing before 2010. "

China Builds A Backup GPS System for Wartime

2007-03-23T23:41:00.000-07:00

China Builds A Backup GPS System for Wartime
In Strategy Page

March 23, 2007: "China is building a satellite positioning system that they may reserve solely for military use, and only in wartime at that. This would enable China to jam GPS, or destroy GPS satellites, while using their more distant (and thus more difficult to destroy) satellite positioning system. All this came out of what was shaping up to be a technological disaster.

Chinas foray into military space satellites has produced a lot of failed experiments, as have their other efforts to develop high tech. For example, back in 2003, China completed a satellite navigation system called BeiDou. Think of it as GPS light, and different, and potentially not very useful. BeiDou only covers East Asia, but not all of China. But it covers the areas along the coast, and Taiwan. The BeiDou system is less accurate than GPS, slower, but it does allow two way traffic. This is useful for sending short messages (up to 120 Chinese characters so, about a hundred words). Sort of IM (Instant Messaging) class stuff. The system can only handle a few hundred thousand users, but that would be sufficient for the number of Chinese troops involved in any major operation. BeiDou also suffers some reliability problems, and is apparently very vulnerable to jamming and spoofing. Because of all that, it is believed that BeiDou is just a first generation system. A training system, one where China learns the ins and outs of building satellite navigation systems.

China realized that the only way to make BeiDou into something useful was to keep the system secret. Or at least off line most of the time. Normally, China uses GPS, and soon the Russian GLONASS and eventually the European Galileo satellite positioning system. But having a backup system, in BeiDou, could be a decisive military asset. The BeiDou satellites are geostationary, and thus farther away from earth (and harder for killer satellites to get to.) Not invulnerable, just more of a hassle to deal with. In wartime, even hassles can be useful".

"Imbróglio" no Galileo

2007-03-22T21:58:00.000-07:00

Tempos de incerteza quando ao projecto de navegação e posicionamento por satélite europeu. As dúvidas quanto à viabilidade do Galileo face á concorrência do norte-americano GPS e do chinês Beidou juntam-se aos desentendimentos entre as empresas do consórcio responsável pelo desenvolvimento do projecto.

As notícias avolumam-se:
"Galileo companies given deadline ", BBC.
"Les Européens tentent d'éviter le naufrage de Galileo", Le Monde.

EU Warns Against Further Delays to Galileo System

2007-03-19T19:59:00.000-07:00

DW, 18/03/2007

"The European Commission warned that it will examine new ways to complete the Galileo satellite navigation system after the project stalled amid doubts about profitability.
The system, worth around 1.5 billion euros ($1.95 billion) and meant to be in space in 2010, is aimed at breaking Europe's dependence on the free US Global Positioning System (GPS), used aboard many cars, boats and aircraft and providing Europe with commercial and strategic navigational autonomy.

In a letter sent last week to the European Union's German presidency, Transport Commissioner Jacques Barrot requested a mandate to study "reasonable alternatives" to the current Galileo consortium of eight private contractors.

Stepping up the rhetoric, he accused industry giants AENA, Alcatel, EADS, Finmeccanica, Hispasat, Inmarsat, TeleOp and Thales of being responsible for delays in the project.

Late, expensive, no one in control.
I consider that the delay so far accumulated and the absence of any sign of progress ... must now be considered as risk for the delivery of the project in the timeline that we envisaged," Barrot wrote.

"Moreover, we have to fear significant cost increases which could go well beyond the foreseen budget," he said in the letter, which was also sent to the eight contractors and the European parliament. "I will undertake to explore alternatives for delivering the project, based on a detailed technical, financial, program management review."

Barrot complained there was no single company structure to regroup the partners, nor any negotiator to speak with the Galileo Supervisory Authority, the public body overseeing the project.

Delays expected to continue

Negotiations to set up a consortium have been suspended as the companies involved are at loggerheads over sharing development costs, and a final agreement on a 20-year services and satellite contract is also unlikely to be completed before the end of next year.
Barrot's spokesman said the timetable for putting the system, to ultimately involve around 30 satellites, in place had already been delayed until 2011, and that more slippage was expected.

"More than ever we have a responsibility to make this project succeed, ensuring at the same time Europe's independence and excellence in a sector critical to our future competitiveness," Barrot added.

Can Galileo make a profit?

The Financial Times newspaper said there were doubts whether Galileo could attract enough revenue, as people within the project doubted whether it would restart unless there were guarantees it could win business from the free American GPS.

"There is a doubt over the revenues," an unnamed executive told the paper. "Why sell Pepsi-Cola when you can get Coca-Cola free?"

While it is difficult to see what real alternatives to the big eight Barrot has, the commissioner said he wanted to set a May 10 deadline for the companies to act, and expects to receive a mandate to make such a demand next week.
He said he would review the companies' reactions and recommend how the project should proceed to EU transport minister in June.

Competition moving forward

In contrast to GPS, which is run by the US Defence Department, Galileo will be used for civilian purposes only.

The European satellite navigation system will monitor natural disasters, in air and sea rescue services and a range of commercial uses, including possibly road safety and pricing.

The EU fears that China could launch a competitor before Galileo is fully operational. Russia is currently also improving its global satellite navigation fleet and will have spacecraft in orbit by the end of this year".

European Commission sets Galileo satellite navigatiion deadline

2007-03-19T19:56:00.000-07:00

Eight suppliers must form a single company by May
By Paul Meller, IDG News Service
March 19, 2007

"The European Commission has given the eight companies picked to build and run the Galileo satellite navigation system until 10 May to create a single company and choose a chief executive.
The commission is concerned about slipping deadlines and a lack of coordination for Galileo, planned as Europe's answer to the US's global positioning system (GPS). But it remains vague about what it would do if the companies fail to meet the deadline.
"If there's no reaction in time then we'll have to look for alternative solutions," said commission spokesman Michele Cercone. "We'll talk about the alternatives after 10 May if the deadline is missed," he added.
Earlier this week, Jacques Barrot, commissioner for transport, wrote to the companies warning them that there was "a risk to the delivery of the project on the timeline that we envisaged". He added: "We have to fear significant cost increases which could go well beyond the foreseen budget."
Galileo was supposed to be up and running in 2010. However, 2011 now looks more realistic, Cercone said, but added that the launch could slip further. "I do not exclude that we will have to revisit some fundamental aspects of our earlier assumptions and approach," Barrot added.
Cercone denied that this meant stripping the companies of their contracts. "There are worries but there still is time," he said.
"The companies just have to accelerate their work," he said. The commercial viability of Galileo was questioned late last year when it emerged that a satellite system being developed by China would compete with Galileo in some commercial markets. However, the commission denies that this has anything to do with the current problems besetting Galileo.
"There's absolutely no linkage here," Cercone said. "There is a degree of complementarily between the different systems that exist and ones that are being developed by Europe, China, India and Russia. It is potentially such a huge market that there will be space for all actors," he added.
He likened the satellite navigation market to the market for mobile phones which emerged in the 1990s. "Satellite navigation could become as useful to daily life as mobile phones and there are numerous operators in that market," he said. The companies in the Galileo consortium are EADS, the Franco-German parent of Airbus, Thales Navigation and Alcatel-Lucent from France, Inmarsat of the UK, Italy's Finmeccanica, Aena and Hispasat from Spain and a German joint venture led by Deutsche Telekom.
Galileo is intended to be a more accurate version of the GPS system currently in use around the world. It is also intended to be for purely civilian use. The GPS system can be shut down by the Pentagon when the US military needs it".

Power struggle jeopardises EU Galileo satellite system

2007-03-18T08:49:00.000-07:00

By Helena Spongenberg

"Political wrangling between governments and companies in the EU is jeopardising the bloc's biggest ever joint technological project – the Galileo satellite navigation system – which is already facing several delays.An internal power struggle has led to the negotiations in the private consortium - consisting of eight European firms who will implement and run the Galileo system - being suspended because they cannot agree a common commercial position.
EU transport commissioner Jacques Barrot said on Wednesday (14 March) he was writing to the companies building the Galileo system to discover the reason for more than a year's delay. "They are just not working," his spokesman Michele Cercone said, according to the Financial Times.The consortium includes European aerospace company EADS, France's Thales and Alcatel-Lucent, the UK's Inmarsat, Italy's Finmeccanica, AENA and Hispasat of Spain, and a German group led by Deutsche Telekom.The companies are reportedly holding out for more work to be guaranteed by the consortium.Officials from the EU and the European Space Agency have since June 2005 been negotiating with this group to put in place the details of a 20-year concession."The Spanish firms are the current block," says one source close to the consortium's negotiations, according to NewScientist.com."They are making outrageous demands over guaranteed work share arrangements. But Spain has already secured a completely unnecessary control centre and people aren't having any more," the source said.However, there have also been complaints of political meddling, with EU member states still pushing for their interests to be taken into account. Arguments continue over where control centres should be sited and where industrial contracts should be placed.Severe delaysGalileo was meant to end reliance on the US Global Positioning System (GPS) by 2010. The US version is a free network but it is military-run meaning that it can be switched off at the whim of the Pentagon. The date has now been postponed to 2011 at the earliest.Galileo's 30 satellites are to be launched into mid-Earth orbits at a cost of around €3.2 billion, with one third of that coming from EU taxpayers, and the rest coming from the consortium hoping to regain its investment by selling location-based technology and services.The consortium was meant to have formed a single Galileo operating company by the end of 2006 as well as appointed an independent chief executive.The delays mean that orders cannot be placed for Galileo's 30 needed satellites."This is posing major problems. As time schedules slip, costs go up," says Paul Verhoef – the commission's Galileo program manager, according to NewScientist.com. Continued delays could also have an expensive knock-on effect. Last week the European Space Agency, was forced to order Giove-A2, a €30 million Galileo signal testing satellite.It had not planned for the satellite but ordered it to be placed in orbit to maintain rights to Galileo's frequency allocations expected to run out mid-2008.It has fallen to the German government – which currently holds the agenda-setting EU presidency - to try to break the impasse. The country's transport minister, Wolfgang Tiefensee, is set to chair a number of critical meetings, with one of them being a gathering of EU transport ministers in Brussels next week."The consortium must fulfil the conditions and obligations it agreed to in 2005," a spokesman for Tiefensee's office told NewScientist.com. "We expect substantial progress by June.""We will give the companies an ultimatum," a French diplomat said, according to the Financial Times".

Beidou: espaço e posicionamento

2007-03-16T22:19:00.000-07:00

Texto publicado no jornal Hoje Macau, 16 de Março de 2007.

José Carlos Matias

Nas últimas semanas, o programa espacial chinês voltou à agenda dos meios de comunicação devido à realização do teste anti-satélite que destrui um antigo satélite meteorológico no espaço. Um outro desenvolvimento que recebeu menos atenção reflecte um outro passo dado pela China no âmbito da tecnologia espacial: foi lançado o quarto satélite do sistema de navegação Beidou, depois de quatro anos de inactividade do programa de navegação por satélite da China. Começa assim a desenhar-se um sistema alternativo ao norte-americano GPS e mesmo ao sistema europeu Galileo, do qual a China faz parte enquanto parceiro externo preferencial. À medida que vai emergindo dos escombros do mundo pós-Guerra Fria uma ordem internacional caracterizada por um multipolarismo económico, no espaço desenha-se uma lógica multipolar em que os principais actores são os Estados Unidos, China, União Europeia e Rússia.O Beidou (Ursa Menor em chinês) é, comparativamente ao GPS ou ao Galileo, um sistema limitado, uma vez que tendo apenas quatro satélites no espaço em órbita geoestacionária cobrindo apenas pouco mais que o território da China e as zonas adjacentes.

O “salto em frente” do Beidou

Contudo são cada vez mais óbvios os sinais de que o Beidou deverá evoluir para um sistema de navegação e posicionamento por satélite, rival dos já existentes GPS dos Estados Unidos, ao russo GLONASS e ao projecto europeu Galileo, que está a dar os primeiros passos. Aliás, essa intenção é explícita no “Livro Branco das Actividades Espaciais da China”, documento em que é referido como um dos objectivos para a primeira década do século XXI o estabelecimento de um sistema independente de navegação e posicionamento, uma tecnologia que permite através da triangulação de sinais entre um aparelho receptor, uma base terrestre e, no mínimo a combinação de sinais de três satélites obter com precisão – dependendo do serviço que se está autorizado a usar – o posicionamento de uma pessoa ou objecto.
Sendo uma tecnologia usada cada vez mais para fins civis, os sistemas de navegação e posicionamento têm potencialidades militares imensas, como de resto foi visível na última invasão norte-americana do Iraque. De resto, o único sistema em funcionamento, o norte-americano GPS foi criado nos anos 1970 com propósitos militares e ainda hoje está na dependência do Departamento de Defesa dos Estados Unidos. Quanto ao Galileo, dirigido pela Agência Espacial Europeia (ESA) e pelo Directorate-General de Transportes e Energia da Comissão Europeia, trata-se de um projecto apresentado como meramente civil mas que tem obviamente implicações importantes ao nível da modernização e reforço da Política Europeia de Segurança e Defesa. O Galileo já tem um de uma série de 26 satélites em órbita e espera-se que m 2010 tenha o sistema a funcionar em pleno.

As relações EUA-UE-China

Em 2003, a China e a União Europeia assinaram um acordo de cooperação no projecto Galileo, segundo o qual Pequim contribui com 200 milhões de euros, tornando-se assim no principal parceiro externo de Bruxelas neste sistema alternativo ao GPS. Na altura, os EUA tentaram impedir a entrada da China no Galileo, depois de antes terem procurado junto dos estados-membros mais “transatlanticistas” abortar o nascimento do sistema europeu de navegação por satélite. Para Washington a perspectiva do Exército Popular de Libertação ter acesso a uma tecnologia sensível com esta potencialidade militar suscita fortes dores de cabeça, em especial às sensibilidades que advogam a tese da “Ameaça Chna”, que habitam em certos círculos próximos do Pentágono. É o caso de Hans Binnendijk: “É preciso que haja um acordo transatlântico sobre a forma como a Europa se vai comportar se os EUA se vissem forçados a um conflito com a China. Por exemplo, a China investiu fortemente no Galileo, o sistema europeu de navegação por satélite. A China vai utilizar essa tecnologia para direccionar as armas de precisão. Esta possibilidade deve ser negada à China em tempos de guerra com os Estados Unidos ou os seus aliados norte-americanos”. Esta visão alude à perspectiva de uma guerra no estreito, um cenário improvável, que ainda ocupa as mentes de vários analistas nos EUA. A UE já garantiu que o código de precisão máxima, o PRS Code, apenas vai ser concedido a entidades militares e de segurança dos estados-membros da UE e às Forças de Reacção Rápida, no contexto do desenvolvimento da Política Externa de Segurança Comum e da Política Europeia de Segurança e Defesa. Além do mais, em 2004 Washington e Bruxelas assinaram um acordo de interoperabilidade entre o GPS e Galileo de modo a evitar a sobreposição de sinais entre os dois sistemas. Contudo, a desconfiança dos norte-americanos mantém-se. David Lague, no International Herald Tribune, salienta o fundamento dos receios de Washington: “O acesso da China ao sistema Galileo é encarado por alguns analistas como um retrocesso sério nos esforços dos Estados Unidos de limitar o acesso da China a tecnologia militar avançada. Os críticos da participação chinesa no projecto Galileo dizem que a União Europeia está, na verdade, a ajudar à modernização militar da China apesar da existência do embargo à venda de armas”.

Galileo: quo vadis?

Para os mais atentos, parece claro que um dos objectivos da participação da China no Galileo tem a ver com o acesso à transferência de tecnologia. O objectivo já tinha sido anunciado no Livro Branco das Actividades Espaciais Chinesas: a construção de um sistema independente chinês. Os passos estão a ser dados mais rapidamente do que alguns pensavam. Quando falados em sistemas de navegação e posicionamento não nos referimos apenas às potencialidades militares, mas cada vez mais às aplicações civis. Um dos objectivos da UE nesta cooperação com a China era ter acesso ao mercado emergente e de massas chinês ao nível das telecomunicações e transportes. A Xinhua referia há quatro meses que o Beidou poderá oferecer um sistema com margem de erro de 10 metros que estaria disponível a todos os chineses “gratuitamente”, ou seja apenas mediante a aquisição do aparelho receptor. Ora, como Paul Marks alerta na revista New Scientist: “Se isto se vier a concretizar, poderá ser um grande problema para o consórcio Galileo que esperava recuperar o investimento de 2.5 mil milhões de euros vendendo receptores e subscrições comerciais na China”. O investimento da China em indústrias de ponta e sectores que representam activos estratégicos na aeronáutica e no espaço não se fica por aqui. Esta semana, a Xinhua revelou que projecto para a construção de aviões de longo curso rival da Boeing e da conturbada europeia Airbus começará a dar os primeiros passo em 2010. Começa a desenhar-se assim uma relação triangular de forças em termos geoeconómicos, especialmente no que diz respeito a indústrias estratégicas que envolvem aplicações militares e civis - aeronáutica e projecção de poder no espaço. A Rússia, o “quarto elemento” nesata dinâmica, emerge cada vez mais como potência energética, ao mesmo tempo que se prepara para finalmente colocar em funcionamento o GLONASS, o sistema russo de navegação e posicionamento por satélite.

Beidou, Galileo e GPS

2007-02-08T19:10:00.000-08:00

China set to launch rival to GPS, Galileo
EE times Europe

John Walko

"LONDON — The launch over the weekend by China of a navigation satellite , its first for four years, could signal the country's challenge to the American Global Positioning System (GPS) and Europe's fledgling Galileo network, in which China is already a partner.
The so called Bediou satellite is bound for a circular geostationary orbit about 22,300 miles high, where it will join three other Beidou craft launched during the past seven years.
China has said it plans to launch a series of satellites to create a space based navigation network called the Compass Navigation Satellite System that would be far more accurate than the system that can be offered from existing craft.
To date the plans for this network have been shrouded in secrecy, with officials repeatedly declining to comment on the project. However, over the weekend, the Chinese news agency Xinhua lifted the veil slightly, and said there are plans to launch other navigation satellites this year to create a network covering the whole of China and parts of some neighboring countries by 2008.
Xinhua said in November that Beijing would provide open access to Beidou signals allowing positioning accuracy within 10 meters.
The Compass system would expand to offer global coverage with the creation of a constellation of 30 medium earth orbit satellites, Xinhua said, but gave no timescales for when this would be operational.
According to a report in FT.com analysts have suggested the expanded Beidou system would use the same radio frequencies as Galileo and possibly GPS, making it more difficult for adversaries to jam the network in case of war.
A Chinese global navigation system could become a significant threat to the 30-satellite European Galileo project, which is not now scheduled to come on stream till 2011.
While China has become an official partner to the European effort, and its government and companies are understood to be investing Euros 200 million ($260 million) with related facilities and research into commercial applications, it is shaping up as a potential competitor".

O teste anti-satélite e o programa espacial da China

2007-01-22T06:32:00.000-08:00

O teste de míssil anti-satélite chinês gerou um coro de protestos face ao perigo de uma nova corrida ao armamento espacial. Na verdade, ao não negar (assumindo por omissão) o ensaio, Pequim deixa uma mensagem ao mundo e em especial aos EUA. É esse o ponto de vista de Joseph Kahn, neste artigo publicado pelo New York Times e International Herald Tribune:

"Some analysts suggested that one possible motivation was to prod the Bush administration to negotiate a treaty to ban space weapons. Russia and China have advocated such a treaty, but President Bush rejected those calls when he authorized a policy that seeks to preserve "freedom of action" in space”.

Já em 2002, A.V. Lele (1), analista do Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (Índia) argumentava que,

"China’s space-based surveillance and remote sensing will increase PLA’s situational awareness. It will help the PLA to understand and analyse USAF assets in more detail. China’s interest in a variety of anti-satellite capabilities, ranging from jammers and blinders to direct energy weapons, poses a threat to US".

É importante entender este ensaio num plano mais amplo que contemple a estratégia da República Popular da China para o espaço. No papel, a política espacial chinesa deve seguir os princípios delineados por Deng Xiaoping: uma política externa independente baseada nos princípios da “Paz e Desenvolvimento”. O “Livro Branco das Actividades Espaciais da China", publicado em 2000 assinala que a política espacial deve servir uma estratégia compreensiva de desenvolvimento,

“in implementing the strategy of revitalizing the country with science and education and that of sustainable development, as well as in economic construction, national security, science and technology development and social progress”.

O programa especial chinês chamou a atenção dos mais distraídos quando em 2003, Yang Liwei se tornou no primeiro taikonauta, ou seja, no primeiro astronauta chinês, a bordo da Shenzhou V (Nave Divina V) Dois anos depois Fei Junlong e Nie Haisheng na missão Shenzhou VI regressaram ao espaço. A China ingressara no clube restrito onde estão EUA e Rússia que enviaram missões tripuladas ao espaço. Mas naturalmente, a estratégia da China vai para além de enviar mais taikonautas para o espaço. O referido Livro Branco estabelece que, no médio-prazo, sejam criados e desenvolvidos projectos, entre outros, como

1- Um sistema de observação da Terra que permita operações de longo-prazo capazes de monitorizar a atmosfera e os oceanos.

2- Melhorar a acapacidade de lançamento de veículos e criar um sistema independente de satélites de telecomunicações

3- Criar um sistema de navegação eposicionamento por satélite independente

4- Estabelecer um sistema nacional de satélites com aplicações de controlo-remoto

5- Desenvolver pesquisa espacial através do desenvolvimento de um grupo de satélites exploratórios de nova geração

Parte destes objectivos já começaram a ser cumpridos. Ao nível dos satélites de navegação existe um sistema de três satélites geoestacionários denominado Beidou (Ursa Maior). Trata-se de um sistema de satélites que não poderá ser comparado ao norte-americano Global Positioning System (GPS), ao russo GLONASS ou ao futuro Galileo (projecto da União Europeia e da ESA do qual a China faz parte como principal parceiro externo), uma vez que a cobertura é limitada apenas com três satélites – um sistema de GPS normalmente requer entre 25 a 30 satélites em órbita. Todavia, é interessante notar que, seguindo a investigação desenvolvida por George Forden (2), ao passo que o Beidou demostra evidentes fragilidades na condução de armas convencionais em terra - como por exemplo as chamadas bombas inteligentes – preenche os requisitos para melhorar a precisão de mísseis balísticos intercontinentais (ICBM). Por outro lado, a cooperaçãop da China no Galileo permitirá a transferência de tecnologia necessária a no futuro criar um GPS próprio, tal como é enunciado no terceiro ponto referido acima acerca dos objectivos no médio-prazo da política espacial da China. Neste artigo publicado pela Xinhua News Agency (agência noticiosa oficial da República Popular da China), este argumento ganha força:

"China's "Beidou" navigation system is a regional positioning system mainly covering the country and its neighboring areas, thus making vertical positioning impossible and limiting the number of users. Academician Liang Sili, who once served as the general engineer of the nation's Aerospace Ministry, said that the global positioning system is a apace infrastructure facility. China is bound to be a space power in the 21st century, able and necessary to possess its own navigation system. The Sino-EU cooperation will significantly help China to attain its goal".

No mesmo artigo,

“(…) for a long time, what the United States has provided to its military units are precise positioning signals, whereas the ones it provided to other users are low-precision signals (with deliberately added interference). That is to say, only Americans know the exact position of any object on the earth, other countries only have a "general idea" concerning the position"

O fim do unipolarismo norte-americano também no espaço parece ser também uma inevitabilidade. Falta agora saber se o desenho de um mundo bipolar (tripolar ou mesmo multipolar se incluirmos a Rússia e a UE com o Galileo), poderá transformar-se num espaço multilateral. Para isso terão que ser constituídos regimes (no sentido do liberal-institucionalismo). Com os recentes desenvolvimentos a China procura também colcar-se numa posição em que a recusa dos EUA em incluir Pequim no Projecto da Estação Espacial Internacional, um projecto que engloba a ESA, EUA, Rússia, Japão e Canadá, seja insustentável. A ascençãod a China enquanto um Space Player, quer metermos de aplicações civis como militares – e sabemos que ambas as dimensões estão intimamente ligadas –deve ser absorvida. A China deve ser engaged não apenas na ONU ou OMC mas também como um poder espacial. Numa perspectiva realista (no sentido das teorias das Relações Internacionais) o dilema de segurança e as pulsões sinófobas poderão fazer com que a resposta dos EUA a esta ascensão seja de escalada. O terreno (o espaço) é escorregadio.

(1) Lele, A. V. (2002, April). "China as a Space Power". Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA Apr-Jun 2002 (Vol. XXVI).

(2) Forden, Geoffrey (2004). "China’s Satellite-Based Navigation System: Implications for Conventional and Strategic Forces". Breakthroughs, Vol. XIII, no. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 8-13.

P.S. Ler também:

Matias, José Carlos (2006). O Grande Salto. Revista Macau IV Série N°2 Março, 2006.

Flexing muscle, China destroys satellite in test

2007-01-19T01:00:00.000-08:00

International Herald Tribune.

By William J. Broad and David E. Sanger
Thursday, January 18, 2007

"China successfully carried out its first test of an antisatellite weapon last week, signaling its resolve to play a major role in military space activities and bringing expressions of concern from Washington and other capitals, the Bush administration said yesterday.
Only two nations — the Soviet Union and the United States — have previously destroyed spacecraft in antisatellite tests, most recently the United States in the mid-1980s.
Arms control experts called the test, in which the weapon destroyed an aging Chinese weather satellite, a troubling development that could foreshadow an antisatellite arms race. Alternatively, however, some experts speculated that it could precede a diplomatic effort by China to prod the Bush administration into negotiations on a weapons ban.
"This is the first real escalation in the weaponization of space that we've seen in 20 years," said Jonathan McDowell, a Harvard astronomer who tracks rocket launchings and space activity. "It ends a long period of restraint."
White House officials said the United States and other nations, which they did not identify, had "expressed our concern regarding this action to the Chinese." Despite its protest, the Bush administration has long resisted a global treaty banning such tests because it says it needs freedom of action in space.
Jianhua Li, a spokesman at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, said that he had heard about the antisatellite story but that he had no statement or information.
At a time when China is modernizing its nuclear weapons, expanding the reach of its navy and sending astronauts into orbit for the first time, the test appears to mark a new sphere of technical and military competition. American officials complained yesterday that China had made no public or private announcements about its test, despite repeated requests by American officials for more openness about its actions.
The weather satellite hit by the weapon had circled the globe at an altitude of roughly 500 miles. In theory, the test means that China can now hit American spy satellites, which orbit closer to Earth. The satellites presumably in range of the Chinese missile include most of the imagery satellites used for basic military reconnaissance, which are essentially the eyes of the American intelligence community for military movements, potential nuclear tests and even some counterterrorism, and commercial satellites.
Experts said the weather satellite's speeding remnants could pose a threat to other satellites for years or even decades.
In late August, President George W. Bush authorized a new national space policy that ignored calls for a global prohibition on such tests. The policy said the United States would "preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space" and "dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so." It declared the United States would "deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests."
The Chinese test "could be a shot across the bow," said Theresa Hitchens, director of the Center for Defense Information, a private group in Washington that tracks military programs. "For several years, the Russians and Chinese have been trying to push a treaty to ban space weapons. The concept of exhibiting a hard-power capability to bring somebody to the negotiating table is a classic cold war technique."
Gary Samore, the director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, said in an interview: "I think it makes perfect sense for the Chinese to do this both for deterrence and to hedge their bets. It puts pressure on the U.S. to negotiate agreements not to weaponize space."
Hitchens and other critics have accused the administration of conducting secret research on advanced antisatellite weapons using lasers, which are considered a far speedier and more powerful way of destroying satellites than the weapons of two decades ago.
The White House statement, issued by the National Security Council, said China's "development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space area."
An administration official who had reviewed the intelligence about China's test said the launching was detected by the United States in the early evening of Jan. 11, which would have been early morning on Jan. 12 in China. American satellites tracked the launching of the medium-range ballistic missile, and later space radars saw the debris.
The antisatellite test was first reported late Wednesday on the Web site of Aviation Week and Space Technology, an industry magazine. It said intelligence agencies had yet to "complete confirmation of the test."
The test, the magazine said, appeared to employ a ground-based interceptor that used the sheer force of impact rather than an exploding warhead to shatter the satellite.
Dr. McDowell of Harvard said the satellite was known as Feng Yun, or "wind and cloud." Launched in 1999, it was the third in a series. He said that it was a cube measuring 4.6 feet on each side, and that its solar panels extended about 28 feet. He added that it was due for retirement but that it still appeared to be electronically alive, making it an ideal target.
"If it stops working," he said, "you know you have a successful hit."
David C. Wright, a senior scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, a private group in Cambridge, Mass., said he calculated that the Chinese satellite had shattered into 800 fragments four inches wide or larger, and millions of smaller pieces.
The Soviet Union conducted roughly a dozen antisatellite tests from 1968 to 1982, Dr. McDowell said, adding that the Reagan administration carried out its experiments in 1985 and 1986.
The Bush administration has conducted research that critics say could produce a powerful ground-based laser weapon that would be used against enemy satellites.
The largely secret project, parts of which were made public through Air Force budget documents submitted to Congress last year, appears to be part of a wide-ranging administration effort to develop space weapons, both defensive and offensive.
The administration's laser research is far more ambitious than a previous effort by the Clinton administration to develop an antisatellite laser, though the administration denies that it is an attempt to build a laser weapon.
The current research takes advantage of an optical technique that uses sensors, computers and flexible mirrors to counteract the atmospheric turbulence that seems to make stars twinkle. The weapon would essentially reverse that process, shooting focused beams of light upward with great clarity and force.
Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a group that studies national security, called the Chinese test very un-Chinese.
"There's nothing subtle about this," he said. "They've created a huge debris cloud that will last a quarter century or more. It's at a higher elevation than the test we did in 1985, and for that one the last trackable debris took 17 years to clear out."
Krepon added that the administration had long argued that the world needed no space-weapons treaty because no such arms existed and because the last tests were two decades ago. "It seems," he said, "that argument is no longer operative."

China and Galileo

2006-12-08T11:13:00.000-08:00

China expected to use Galileo satellite navigation system in 2008
People's Daily

The European Union's Galileo satellite navigation system, a rival to the reigning global positioning system (GPS)of the United States, is expected to be operational in China in 2008.
The 30-satellite system, with a navigational fix accurate to within one meter, will provide safe, reliable and accurate navigational information for Chinese users in fields of civil aviation, railway, waterway and road transportation, according to a Sino-EU technology cooperation symposium in Nanjing, capital of east China's Jiangsu Province.
China officially joined the project in 2004 and invested 200 million euros in a Galileo training and application research center based in Southeast University in Nanjing.
The center carries out research on the satellite receiver, chips and communication system and provides scientific training for the Galileo project, said Li Jianqing, head of the technology department of the university.
The European Union (EU) and the European Space Agency kicked off the 3.5 billion-euro Galileo Project in March 2002 to develop a satellite-navigation system independent of the U.S. GPS monopoly.
Unlike the military-managed GPS, Galileo will stay under civilian control, increasing the EU's strategic independence.
Israel, India and South Korea have also joined the Galileo project.
Source: Xinhua

1- A Estratégia Europeia para o Espaço I

2006-11-07T07:13:00.000-08:00

Para entender o projecto Galileo é essencial enquadrar este empreendimento numa perspectiva ampla e abrangente da estratégia europeia para o Espaço. Sendo a União Europeia um actor global em emergência a existência de uma estratégia unificada e coerente para o sector espacial é condição sine qua non para a sua afirmação como potência económica e política. Nas palavras de C.Bilt, D. Keohane, X. Pasco, e T. Valasek,“Uma Europa sem uma estratégia espacial clara é uma Europa sem ambição”. A formulação de uma Estratégia Espacial Europeia (EES) e de um Programa Espacial Europeu (PES), ao nível da UE, teve início em 2003 – embora tenha sido dsicutida ao nível da Agência Espacial Europeia muito antes - com o um “Green Paper” seguido de um “White Paper” entitulado “Space a New Frontier for an expanding Union – An Action Plan for implementing the European Space Policy”.
Este último documento começa por enunciar os princípios por que se deve guiar a política espacial europeia, considerando que o Espaço pode e deve servir de apoio às políticas europeias, como o crescimento económico, a criação de emprego e a competitividade industrial, um alargamento da União bem-sucedido, o desenvolvimento sustentado, política de defesa e segurança, a luta contra a pobreza ou a ajuda ao desenvolvimento. Esta percepção certamente, impulsionou a elaboração de uma política comum espacial. Mas, naturalmente, que a visão de que a UE estava a ficar para trás face ao mais directos competidores em termos de competitividade da sua indústria aeronáutica e espacial também teve um papel deveras relevante neste processo. A inacção levaria a dois perigos reais:

(i) O declínio das suas capacidades enquanto actor espacial; se o a UE não acompanhasse a evolução do sector, a sua capacidade para integrar e desenvoler tecnologias sensíveis seria altamente danificada

(ii) O declínio das suas companhias e empresas ligadas à industria esapcial por causa da ausência de um mercado forte no sector e devido á auisência de investimento público em novos programas

Neste diagnóstico preliminar identificamos, desde logo, duas dimensões chave das aspirações europeias no Espaço: por um lado, a necessidade que a UE se torne, indubitavelmente, num actor global no espaço – lugar de projecção de poder dos estados nação (neste caso um bloco de nações); por outro, a importância da UE fortalecer a posição dos seus actores privados neste campo na competição global pela liderança na área da alta tecnologia, nomeadamente, aeronáutica, defesa e espaço.

Galileo: abordagens a um dos principais "grands projets" da UE

2006-08-10T13:58:00.000-07:00

1- A Estratégia Europeia para o Espaço

2- Porquê um "GPS Europeu"

3 - A dimensão securitária do Galileo

4- As reacções dos EUA ao Projecto Galileo

Em breve neste blogue.

Galileo: o quê, quem, quando, onde, de que modo.

2006-08-02T06:01:00.000-07:00

caveat:
Não confundir este projecto Galileo com outro projecto: a sonda espacial Galileo.

1 - A apresentação do Galileo, na página da Comissão Europeia.
2 - O Galileo na wikipedia
3 - O Bê-a-ba na bê-bê-cê

Outros horizontes

2006-08-02T05:10:00.000-07:00

Desde há algum tempo que olho com atenção para o projecto Galileo, o sistema de Navegação e Posicionamento por Satélite da União Europeia, contruído –em construção– como alternativa (competidor) ao norte-americano Global Positioning System (GPS).Considerei desde logo interessante este projecto por vários motivos: em primeiro lugar pela dimensão desta parceria entre a UE e a Agência Espacial Europeia (ESA); em segundo pelo facto de ter surgido numa altura em que as águas do Atlântico começam a deixar visíveis algumas fissuras; em terceiro, porque sendo uma “dual-use” technology implica questões de natureza política e económica e, simultaneamente, de índole securitário e, maxime, militar.A importância do Galileo na construção de uma infraestrutura tecnológica, por si só, suscita implicações ao nível da intenção da UE não perder mais tempo numa corrida que continua a perder face aos EUA, ao nível da Investigação e Desenvolvimento e igualmente no que diz respeito à capacidade de dar um novo ímpeto à rede de transportes pan-europeia. Naturalmente que os EUA não viram com bons olhos esta iniciativa europeia. Afinal, por que é que os europeus vão gastar cerca de 3.3 mil milhões de euros num sistema deste género, se têm acesso ao GPS de forma “gratuíta”? Mas o que incomodou ainda mais Washington foi a parceria preferencial firmada entre a UE e a China, no desenvolvimento do Galileo.Não deixa também de ser inetressante que o Galileo esteja sob a alçada da DG TREN – Directorate General dos Transportes e Energia da Comissão Europeia, ao passo que o GPS, criado nos anos 1970, nasceu e continua ligado ao Departamento de Defesa dos EUA.Entretanto, a Rússia pretende finalmente tornar operacional na plenitude o seu sistema, o GLONASS e a China mantém no horizonte a criação de um sistema de navegação e posicionamento por satélite próprio.Para olhar, de vários ângulos, para este tema, nasceu o POJECTO GALILEO.

O Grande Salto para o Espaço

2006-07-25T06:04:00.000-07:00

Este blogue procura reflectir a investigação que o seu autor tem vindo a fazer e trazer à tona as notícias que vão saindo sobre o Galileo - Projecto Europeu de Navegação e Posicionamento por Satélite.